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The Influence of Cognitive Interference and Anxiety on
Working Memory and Performance Validity Tests
Caitlin V. Dombrowski, PhD
University of Connecticut, 2016
Anxiety disorders and situational anxiety are common in the general population, yet the
influence of anxiety symptoms on working memory is poorly understood. Some studies
suggest that anxiety may be inversely related to working memory, possibly due to
reduced cognitive efficiency and/or interference from worry-based cognitions; however,
methodological inconsistencies have undermined generalizability. The high prevalence of
anxiety makes further study of its associated neuropsychological deficits and underlying
mechanism of action tantamount. Moreover, assessment of performance can induce
anxiety in even relatively low anxious individuals, which may also interfere with working
memory and performance-based measurement. In this study, undergraduates with low
and high levels of subclinical anxiety completed working memory tasks during both low
and high situational anxiety phases. Results indicated that although the high anxiety
group reported greater anxiety and task interfering cognitions, anxiety level did not
predict working memory during either phase. In contrast to theoretical models, working
memory performance improved for both groups during the second, high situational
anxiety phase. Secondarily, Performance Validity Tests (PVTs) were embedded in the
evaluation to determine if low effort—a common confounding variable in assessment—
could explain the results of this study. Analyses revealed that 15% of the undergraduate
sample failed at least one PVT, suggesting that a lack of significant differences between
groups may be, at least in part, attributed to low effort. Implications of these findings and
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future directions for neuropsychological research with anxious individuals and
undergraduates are discussed.

Keywords: anxiety, working memory, cognitive interference, performance
validity tests, effort

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY

The Influence of Cognitive Interference and Anxiety on Working Memory and
Performance Validity Tests

Caitlin V. Dombrowski, M.A.

B.S. University of Connecticut, 2010
M.A. University of Connecticut, 2014

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the
University of Connecticut

2016

i

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY

Copyright by
Caitlin V. Dombrowski

2016

ii

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY
Approval Page

Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation

The Influence of Cognitive Interference and Anxiety on
Working Memory and Performance Validity Tests

Presented by
Caitlin V. Dombrowski, M.A.

Major Advisor__________________________________________________________
Kimberli Treadwell, Ph.D.

Associate Advisor_______________________________________________________
Chi-Ming Chen, Ph.D.

Associate Advisor_______________________________________________________
Kevin P. Young, Ph.D.

University of Connecticut
2016

iii

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY

iv

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Kimberli Treadwell for
helping me pursue my dream of becoming a psychologist. I am so grateful for your
gracious and steady guidance throughout my graduate school education, particularly as
my clinical interests and research plans meandered and morphed over time.
Dr. Sarah Bullard, thank you for sharing your infectious passion for
neuropsychological practice and encouraging me to unabashedly pursue my career goals.
Special thanks to Dr. Kevin Young for joining my committee as an honorary faculty
member, helping me turn early research musings into this fully-formed product, and,
most importantly, expanding and challenging my clinical purview. Thank you to all my
committee members, Drs. Treadwell, Young, and Chi-Ming Chen, and readers, Drs.
Deborah Fein and Stephanie Milan, for providing insightful feedback about my study
formulation, conceptualization, and writing. Additionally, as a decade-long student and
now three-time alumna of the University of Connecticut, I would like to thank all of my
professors for investing in my academic and professional training. I am incredibly
grateful for the psychology department’s commitment to teaching, mentorship, and
educational integrity. Furthermore, thanks to the numerous external supervisors who
guided me through my pre-doctoral clinical training and inspired me to pursue
compassionate patient care.
In addition to faculty support and advisement, this study was accomplished in
large part thanks to the heroic efforts of my undergraduate research assistants, fondly
known as the Watch Brigade—Erica Crowley, Gianmarco Vitti, Madeline Farrell,
Melanie Lora, JC Gonzalez, Olivia Benson, Susan Kusmierski, and Taylor Brosnihan.

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY

v

Remember, you always, always own the pen. Special thanks go out to JC for assisting
with training materials, the IRB, and any and all extraneous study preparations. I would
also like to express the sincerest gratitude to my lovely lab mates (and budding
psychologists), Amanda J. LeTard and Catherine Stewart, for willingly, and sometimes
resignedly, listening to my hypothetical research ideas and clinical ponderings. I already
miss working alongside you. Thank you also to the University of Connecticut Graduate
School for availing dissertation fellowship funds, which aided in the purchase of
discounted research equipment from Western Psychological Services and Multi-Health
Systems, Inc. Thanks for your support of student-led research projects.
From the first class to my dissertation defense, thank you to all my friends and
family near and far for supporting me on this academic journey. To my UConn
classmates, peers, and friends, you have made this community an easy place to call home
for so many years. I am in awe of your spirit, companionship, and incredible talents, and I
look forward to calling you colleagues for many more years. Finally, thank you most
humbly to my family and closest confidants. None of my achievements would have been
possible without your support and encouragement.

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY

vi

Table of Contents

Title Page ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i
Approval Page ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ iii
Acknowledgements ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ iv
Table of Contents --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vi
Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Historical and Theoretical Basis of Anxiety and Cognition -------------- 2
Theories and Evidence for an Anxiety-Working Memory Relationship 5
Working Memory and Trait Anxiety ------------------------------- 6
Working Memory and State or Situational Anxiety -------------- 7
Cognitive Interference, Anxiety, and Working Memory -------- 8
Summary of Anxiety and Working Memory Findings -------------------- 9
Validity of Cognitive Assessment in Anxiety ------------------------------ 10
Validity of Cognitive Assessment in Undergraduate Participants ------ 13
Purpose --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Hypotheses ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Methods -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Participants ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Measures ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19
Procedure ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 27
Administration Training ------------------------------------------------------- 29
Procedure Fidelity -------------------------------------------------------------- 30
Data Analytic Plan ------------------------------------------------------------- 30
Power Section ------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
Missing Data -------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
Results ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
Descriptive Statistics ----------------------------------------------------------- 33
Descriptive Statistics by Group ---------------------------------------------- 33
Baseline Symptom Group Comparisons ------------------------------------ 34
Manipulation Check ------------------------------------------------------------ 34

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY

vii

Hypothesis 1 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
Hypothesis 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
Hypothesis 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
Hypothesis 4 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
Hypothesis 5 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
Discussion ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
Working Memory and Anxiety ----------------------------------------------- 40
Performance Validity ---------------------------------------------------------- 42
Limitations ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
Conclusions and Future Directions ------------------------------------------ 48
Appendix A – Examiner-Administered Instructions ---------------------------------------- 50
Appendix B – Cognitive Interference Questionnaire ---------------------------------------- 52
Appendix C – Tables ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53
Table 1. Demographic Information, Overall Sample ---------------------- 53
Table 2. Demographic/Questionnaire Information, by Group ----------- 54
Table 3. Experimental Phases Questionnaire Information --------------- 55
Table 4. Cognitive Measures (TMT/CWIT), by Group ------------------- 56
Table 5. Cognitive Measures (DS/SS), by Group ------------------------- 57
Table 6. PVT Cutoffs Implemented ----------------------------------------- 58
Table 7. PVT Failures --------------------------------------------------------- 59
Table 8. Specific PVT Failures, by Group during Phase 1 --------------- 60
Table 9. Overall PVT Failures, by Group during Phase 1 ---------------- 61
Table 10. PVT Scores by Group --------------------------------------------- 62
Table 11. PVT Failures by Participant -------------------------------------- 63
Appendix D – Figure 1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64
References ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY

1

The Influence of Cognitive Interference and Anxiety on Working Memory and
Performance Validity Tests
Anxiety disorders are the most commonly diagnosed group of psychological
disorders, with even higher prevalence rates than mood disorders (Kessler, Berglund, &
Demler, 2005). The lifetime prevalence of anxiety disorders in the United States
population is 28.8% and the 12-month prevalence remains high at 18.1% (Kessler et al.,
2005). In addition, anxiety disorders are known contributors to heightened disability in
cognition, life activities, participation, and social interaction (Hendriks et al., 2014), as
well as social and financial burdens (Tolin, Gilliam, & Dufresne, 2009). Not only do
individuals with anxiety disorders often have comorbid medical conditions, they are also
more likely than others to use medical care services, even when controlling for medical
condition (Ford, Trestman, Steinberg, Tennen, & Allen, 2004; Marciniak, Lage,
Landbloom, Dunayevich, & Bowman, 2004; Roy-Byrne et al., 2008; Simon, Ormel,
VonKorff, & Barlow, 1995). This association between medical conditions and anxiety is
likely bidirectional, with worries and anxieties leading to more preoccupation about
health, and genuine health problems leading to worries about possible new conditions.
Thus, neuropsychologists evaluate many individuals with clinical anxiety and/or transient
anxiety in test-taking scenarios.
Elevated anxiety, clinical or situational, is associated with deficits in cognitive
performance—namely the central executive component of working memory (Baddeley,
1986)—although findings are mixed. Several theories have been proposed to account for
these findings, including the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992),
attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), and cognitive
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interference theory (Sarason, 1984). The concurrent impact of generalized and state
anxiety has not been well examined, nor has effort towards testing in anxious
populations. The impact of generalized and state anxiety on attention and working
memory will be examined, as will a relevant confounding variable of effort to
contextualize findings across studies.
Historical and Theoretical Basis of Anxiety and Cognition
Arousal states and performance ability were first studied in the early 20th century,
resulting in the Yerkes-Dodson law, which suggested a U-shaped relationship between
arousal and performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), whereby moderate arousal was
associated with highest performance. Optimal arousal level was also theorized to be
inversely related to task difficulty—best performance on difficult tasks required lower
arousal levels. By the mid-century, high arousal states were thought to reduce attentional
breadth and increase attentional selectivity (Easterbrook, 1959). During the development
and growth of cognitive psychology during the 1960s and 1970s, many researchers
investigated the influence of emotional states on performance, as well as the mediation of
this relationship by cognitive mechanisms (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2010). Emotionality,
particularly from bias towards negative information, tends to interrupt attentional systems
(Pallak, Pittman, Heller, & Munson, 1975; see Yiend, 2010 for a review). A recent study
found that patients with significant emotional distress who presented for
neuropsychological evaluations had more variable performance on attention and
concentration tests than a control group (Meyers, Grills, Zellinger, & Miller, 2013).
Thusly, individuals with high emotionality might perform efficiently on difficult tasks,
despite comparatively lower performance on more simple tasks. Clinically, this
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discrepancy is often considered a signature neurocognitive profile for individuals with
emotional distress. Some studies have also found that individuals in an aroused state, but
without clinical psychiatric diagnoses, show disrupted attentional patterns. However,
published findings on theorized relationships between arousal states and performance
have been inconsistent. Much research has focused on the influence of anxiety on
attention and working memory, related cognitive constructs with several component
parts. The numerous theories about both of these cognitive functions, as well as the many
experimental approaches and measures to assess them, may be contributing to
inconsistency of findings.
In the 1980s, Baddeley proposed a multi-faceted model of working memory, an
expansion and challenge to the general belief that short-term memory was a unitary
mechanism (Baddeley, 1986). He proposed that working memory consists of three parts:
the central executive controls the processing and allocating of resources between two
“slave systems”: the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. The
phonological loop rehearses and temporarily stores verbal information. Analogously in
the visual mind, the visuo-spatial sketchpad provides this function for visual information.
Frequently, the visual information is also transferred to the phonological loop through
language-based description (Baddeley, 1992). Information in either temporary system
may be discarded or transferred to long-term memory storage. Baddeley later revised his
theory by adding a fourth component of working memory, called the episodic buffer, that
assists with the temporary storage of information from the slave systems. Notably, all
components of working memory have limited storage capacity, the magnitude of which
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varies both between individuals and within an individual depending on transient factors
(e.g., fatigue, motivation).
Subsequently, several competing theories concerning the functions and
subcomponents of the central executive emerged. Barrett, Tugade, and Engle (2004)
suggested that the central executive’s primary task is to allocate attentional resources.
Smith and Jonides (1999) theorized that the central executive is composed of five specific
functions: switching attention between tasks, planning related tasks towards a unified
goal, directing and inhibiting attention, updating and checking working memory storage,
and attaching time and place information to working memory representations. Miyake
and colleagues’ latent factor statistical analysis of actual task performance (Miyake,
2000) led to the proposal of three central executive functions, which overlap considerably
with Smith and Jonides’ theorized model. Miyake’s central executive consists of
inhibiting distracting information, shifting attention, and updating and monitoring
information within working memory stores. Still more, Fournier-Vicente, Larigauderie,
and Gaonac’h (2008), who also used latent variable analysis, identified five executive
functions, described as verbal storage, visuospatial storage, strategic retrieval, selective
attention, and shifting attention. Indeed, there is general disagreement about the
component parts of working memory (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2010). However, attention
and speed of processing are consistently regarded as related and integral components to
working memory; both of which may also be vulnerable to anxiety, other high arousal
states, and effort or motivation towards performance.

COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE AND WORKING MEMORY
Theories and Evidence for an Anxiety-Working Memory Relationship
Many would argue that some anxiety is essential for optimal neurocognitive
performance; however, emotional overarousal and/or hypervigilance for threatening
stimuli, both associated with anxiety, may lead to reduced neurocognitive performance.
Based on Baddeley’s conceptualization of working memory, theorists began to examine
the possible influence of anxiety on working memory and arousal/attention within the
growing fields of experimental and cognitive psychology. There was an expanding body
of literature showing an inverse relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance
(Derakshan & Eysenck, 2010). Although anxiety may disrupt any component in the
working memory system, the central executive is considered the most susceptible to
anxious interference (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2010). Based on Baddeley’s model of
working memory, Eysenck and Calvo proposed the processing efficiency theory, which
was later incorporated into Eysenck’s attentional control theory, to describe the apparent
relationship between trait and state anxiety and cognitive performance within normal
populations (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck, 1979; 1988; Eysenck et al., 2007;
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The theory posed that efficiency (speed) of mental processing
is more likely to be hindered by anxiety than effectiveness (accuracy) of task
performance. The phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad remain adequately
functional, despite a slowing of information processing within the slave systems
(Eysenck et al., 2007)—attributed to the handicapped central executive. The attentional
control theory incorporates Miyake’s (2000) description of subcomponents underlying
the central executive (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009), and posits that the central executive
may be undermined by (1) an anxious focus on task-irrelevant but threat-salient

5
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information (poor inhibition); and (2) a constant search for threatening input
(overshifting). Eysenck first developed these theories of anxious processing inefficiency
and attentional disruption to explain characterological, or trait-like, anxiety in normative
samples rather than clinical samples, which has resulted in more research studies of test
and trait anxieties.
Working Memory and Trait Anxiety. Despite over a century of research on the
influence of emotional states on performance, relatively few studies have directly
assessed the relationship between clinical anxiety and working memory components
(Stein & Rauch, 2010), yet much research has focused on trait anxiety in normative
samples. For example, academically-oriented research has amassed substantial support
for a relationship between test anxiety and academic performance; a meta-analytic review
found small to moderate associations between test anxiety and several performance
indices: intellectual ability, academic achievement testing, and grade point averages
(Hembree, 1988). It is unclear, though, whether test anxiety is assessing trait anxiety,
state anxiety, or some combination of the two (Eysenck, 2010). High trait anxiety has
been found to be associated with slower performance (reduced efficiency) on tasks with
both high and low working memory load (MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Metzger, Miller,
Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990). In another study of individuals with high trait anxiety,
visual working memory was lower when the central executive was engaged by a
secondary task but not when the phonological loop or visuo-spatial sketchpad were
otherwise engaged (Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005). Young adults with current
anxiety disorders showed reduced performance on visual working memory tests
compared to controls (Castaneda et al., 2011). Adults with generalized anxiety disorder
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were found to show reduced attentional control, associated with the frontal, voluntary
processes of the central executive, during periods of heightened task demands
(Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014). In a recently published study
assessing the impact of trait anxiety on shifting ability—a subcomponent of the central
executive—within the context of self-reported effort and situational stress, cognitive trait
anxiety (anxiety symptoms related to cognitions) was associated with poorer shifting
efficiency but not effectiveness (Edwards, Edwards, & Lyvers, 2015); furthermore, the
magnitude of this relationship was greater at times of low effort or high situational stress.
Working Memory and State or Situational Anxiety. Working memory deficits
have also been associated with state anxiety in undergraduate samples (Coy, O'Brien,
Tabaczynski, Northern, & Carels, 2011; Knox & Grippaldi, 1970; Lapointe et al., 2013;
Northern, 2010). These results have included state anxiety brought on by specific
situational stressors, including fear of threat, testing instructions, and clinician-specific
situational factors. For example, male undergraduates in a stress-inducing experimental
group performed worse than controls on declarative memory and working memory tasks;
additionally, their self-reported state anxiety during the task was correlated with
neuropsychological test scores in several domains (Leininger & Skeel, 2012). Structured
medical settings with traditional doctor-patient roles and formalized directions for testing,
rather than a relaxed environment with more casual, friendly interactions and
encouragement, have been associated with heightened state anxiety levels (Etherton &
Axelrod, 2013; Greher, 2003). Studies have also used the threat of shock paradigm to
simulate cognitive states of individuals with clinical anxiety (see Robinson, 2013 for a
review of shock studies), resulting in reduced performance on complex or unpracticed
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tasks (Pyke & Agnew, 1963). Overall, vast methodological differences and
disagreements about cognitive constructs undermine consensus about the relationship
between state anxiety and working memory. Additionally, few studies have examined the
combined effects of transient anxious arousal in clinically anxious individuals—a
commonly seen phenomenon in an assessment setting. In an early study of
neurocognitive abilities, state and trait anxiety were both associated with lower working
memory than verbal reasoning performance (Knox & Grippaldi, 1970). More studies,
however, are needed to understand the contributions of differential and specific anxieties
on working memory performance.
Cognitive Interference, Anxiety, and Working Memory. Sarason proposed the
cognitive interference theory to explain why individuals with anxiety exhibit reduced
working memory (1984). He suggested that preoccupying worries about personal
performance, described as “obsessive self-preoccupation,” unnecessarily raises stress
levels (Sarason & Stoops, 1978, p. 107). As a result, attentional resources are siphoned
away from task-relevant engagement, thereby undermining the individual’s ability to
perform efficiently on cognitive tasks involving working memory and executive
functions. Individuals with anxiety may require additional effort to complete tasks at the
same levels as their peers (Berggren & Derakshan, 2012). Additionally, negative
expectations about one’s potential performance and abilities, likely brought on by the
additional effort dispensed, are thought to further negatively impact their test
performance (Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012a). Cognitive distortions have
even been shown to fully mediate the relationship between test anxiety and academic
achievement in late adolescence (Putwain, Connors, & Symes, 2010). So, although
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pathological worrying may aid the avoidance of overwhelming emotional content,
therefore becoming a basic emotion regulation strategy (Riskind, 2005), it can also
reduce working memory capacity (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008). Several studies
have shown that worry-driven cognitions contribute to the cognitive impairments seen on
neuropsychological testing (Cummings & Mega, 2003; Gualtieri & Morgan, 2008; Leigh
& Hirsch, 2011; N. J. Martin & Franzen, 1989; Metzger et al., 1990). Self-induced worry
as well as attempts to control worry have also led to reduced working memory capacity
(Hallion, Ruscio, & Jha, 2014; Sari, Koster, & Derakshan, 2016). Interestingly,
interfering cognitions were shown to mediate the inverse relationship between state
anxiety and phonological loop/central executive performance but not visuo-spatial
working memory (Coy et al., 2011).
Summary of Anxiety and Working Memory Findings
State and trait anxiety likely disrupt task-relevant processing by the central
executive and the larger working memory system with self-focused, preoccupying worry,
as suggested by Sarason’s cognitive interference theory. However, methodological
inconsistencies, particularly differences in population, anxiety type, component of
cognition (e.g., shifting or inhibiting), and working memory task, have undermined the
ability to draw clinically meaningful conclusions. Moreover, most studies have examined
either trait or state anxiety but not both, making it unclear whether potentially lower
neurocognitive scores on testing are associated with ongoing anxiety or situational
anxiety—which also frequently present together (Eysenck, 2010). It is theorized that
sometimes individuals with anxiety simply perform slower than controls but not worse,
which can complicate results in cases where time of completion is not assessed or
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effectiveness is judged by response time. Besides methodological issues, numerous
confounding variables remain, including situational factors and motivation/effort. Studies
from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and clinical psychology have also aimed at
understanding working memory for “hot” information, or biased cognitions (i.e.,
attention, interpretation, and memory biases) rather than “cold,” neutrally valenced
information, with mixed success (Clarke & MacLeod, 2013; Derakshan & Eysenck,
2010). Additionally, Johnson-Green and Adams have argued that published
neuropsychological profiles of individuals with psychiatric disorders would provide
useful information to the practicing neuropsychologist regarding expected test profiles
(1998). Ongoing neuropsychological research is warranted to investigate the specificity
of neurocognitive deficits associated with anxiety symptoms, particularly how interfering
cognitions relate to the efficiency or effectiveness of different parts of the working
memory system (e.g., shifting, inhibiting).
Validity of Cognitive Assessment in Anxiety
Although much research of the relationship between anxiety and cognitive
performance has focused on attentional control, motivation and effort may play an
important role in performance for any individual, particularly for anxious individuals as
anxiety may produce false positives on effort testing. Many tests of effort rely on an
individual’s attentional and working memory capacity to establish good effort (Wise,
2006). As has been discussed, anxiety also reduces working memory, thereby potentially
undermining the utility of effort testing in this population. In fact, many individuals with
anxiety are highly motivated to perform well, despite behavioral and neurological
impediments to cognitive performance (Berggren & Derakshan, 2012). Effort is an
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important confound to consider when examining neuropsychological underpinnings of
anxiety, as the testing situation itself and motivation towards the assessment may conflate
results. Indeed, effort has been shown to be more influential than emotional valence type
on neuropsychological testing results (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2010). Given that low
effort undermines the ability to measure an individual’s cognitive functioning,
measurement of an individual’s effort towards test-taking has become an emerging
standard in the field of neuropsychology (Constantinou, Bauer, Ashendorf, Fisher, &
McCaffrey, 2005; Larrabee, 2012).
Tests designed to assess effort, or performance validity (PVTs), generally appear
to the test-taker to be tests of traditional neuropsychological constructs with high face
validity (e.g., attention), despite aiming to assess effort; therefore, they can be readily
incorporated into any neuropsychological battery without the examinee’s knowledge.
Few studies of neuropsychological testing in anxious individuals have incorporated PVT;
thus, little is known about anxious individuals’ performance on these measures, and the
degree to which effort or anxiety contribute to outcomes. Given the prevalence of longstanding anxiety and transient anxious responses to testing, it would be helpful for
clinicians to have normative data about the relationship between anxiety levels and effort
during assessments.
Preliminary empirical examination of effort and anxiety suggest that individuals
with anxiety perform adequately on testing. A study of community-dwelling older adults
with state and trait anxiety found that scores on a commonly-used, non-computerized
PVT, the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), were consistent with the performance
of non-anxious controls (Ashendorf, Constantinou, & McCaffrey, 2004). Moreover, none
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of the high anxiety participants scored below the cutoff during the TOMM Trial 2, which
is the standard by which pass/fail rates are typically determined on the measure. The
TOMM and the symptom questionnaires were the only measures used in this study. A
second study of older adults assessing the relationship between the TOMM Trial 2 and
state and trait anxiety also failed to find a relationship (O’Bryant, Finlay, & O’Jile, 2006).
Notably, the second study found relationships between TOMM Trial 1 scores and both
types of anxiety, suggesting that the affective state of the individual should be considered
when deciding to discontinue testing after the first trial (a more recent development
suggested to shorten the measure). The second trial may provide differential information
about the nature of the individual’s failure during the first trial. These findings suggest
that cutoffs for pass/fail scores need to be low enough that performance invalidity is
detected but also high enough that affective arousal does not cause an individual to fail
the measure, i.e., sensitivity and specificity must be balanced.
Both studies presented above suggest that the TOMM provides an effective
measure of effort in anxious older adults. Although preliminary results suggest that
anxiety is not associated with low effort scoring, only one measure was used. Clinical
practice guidelines suggest neuropsychologists use 2-3 tests of effort to note fluctuations
in effort across time as well as to tap slightly different types of effort. In sum, research
involving multiple tests of effort, as well as other forms of anxiety, is needed to fully
evaluate how anxious individuals perform on PVTs, and the potential resulting impact on
assessing neuropsychological status in anxiety.
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Validity of Cognitive Assessment in Undergraduate Participants
A large portion of the literature examining anxiety and neuropsychological
functioning has been conducted in undergraduate samples, which may be a shortcoming
in this area of research. Some researchers have called into question the motivational
status of undergraduates completing course credit as a basis for generalizing analyses of
other constructs to general adult populations. Indeed, few studies with undergraduate
samples have controlled for effort, possibly a frequent confound of published results. In a
direct examination of undergraduate effort during a testing scenario, An, Zakzanis, and
Joordens (2012) reported that over half of their undergraduate sample failed two of three
PVTs, the Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT) and the Dot Counting Test (DCT). In
contrast, all participants passed the TOMM. Results may indicate that the TOMM is less
sensitive to low effort in undergraduate student participants and/or the VSVT and Dot
Counting may overestimate failures. Of yet, it is not clear why the TOMM appears to be
more easily passed by many individuals. Based on their results, An and colleagues argued
that invalidity is a significant concern when using college samples. Although this study
raised a red flag in this field of research, there exist significant limitations with their
methodology, including a relatively small sample size (i.e., 36), unblinded research
assistants, non-standard cutoff used on the VSVT, predominance of female and Asian
students, and half of the sample reporting English as a second language.
In contrast, the majority of subsequent studies have supported valid testing
conditions for undergraduate samples. These studies have incorporated larger sample
sizes, broader representations of ethnicity and gender, and accepted guidelines for
pass/fail cutoffs. In the first study published in contradiction to An’s findings, archival
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data from 100 undergraduates with more representative gender and ethnic characteristics
indicated that few (under 3%) failed PVTs (Silk-Eglit et al., 2014). Several PVTs were
used, including the TOMM, the VSVT, the Word Memory Test (WMT), Reliable Digit
Span, the Medical Symptom Validity Test, and the forced-choice subtest of the California
Verbal Learning Test-II, across two separate samples. A study of undergraduate
performance at a US public university on the WMT found a 6.4% failure rate (Santos,
Kazakov, Reamer, Park, & Osmon, 2014). This study also found that negative demand
characteristics (i.e., the investigator’s demeanor and treatment of the participant) did not
affect WMT scores. In a study using several PVTs, including the DCT, VSVT, and
WMT, 8.3% of the undergraduate sample scored below cutoffs on at least one of the
PVTs during initial testing (Ross et al., 2016); at approximately one-month follow-up
with all participants, just 3.7% failed a PVT. In contrast, to the above presented research
on undergraduate participants, one study used embedded, rather than stand-alone,
measures of effort within the computerized CNS Vital Signs (DeRight & Jorgensen,
2015). In this study, 12% of the sample failed a validity indicator during baseline testing,
and 11% failed one during the repeat administration. In total, 15% of participants failed at
least one embedded PVT. Additionally, a computerized study of question responding
patterns in a low-stakes testing situation, where there are no apparent repercussions for
the participant putting forth suboptimal effort, rapid-guessing behavior were found in less
than 7% of participants (Wise, 2006). Despite this relatively low percentage of random
responding, the author found that even slight increases in random guessing behavior can
have meaningful effects on test reliability.
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Based on the above findings, An and colleagues’ findings of low effort in
undergraduate samples may be an outlier (2012); however, additional studies of testing
validity in college populations may help clarify the magnitude of this issue, particularly
with non-traditional students or in poorly controlled experimental designs. Should An’s
results be an anomaly, there is little reason to doubt the appropriateness of utilizing
college samples for piloting neuropsychological research.
As well, since none of the undergraduate validity studies examined anxiety in
regards to PVTs, it remains important to clarify this issue. This study would be the first to
assess PVT performance in a subclinically anxious undergraduate sample. Furthermore,
assessing for validity allows a researcher to consider excluding undergraduates who fail
to pass these measures, thereby ensuring that their data was validly completed. Therefore,
even if failure rates are low, PVT administration may lead to reducing noise in analyses.
The practice of using PVTs to confirm performance validity is already commonly
considered in clinical research samples and clinical settings; therefore, it appears to be a
reasonable consideration in undergraduate populations where performance validity rates
appear to vary.
Purpose
Despite the high prevalence of anxiety in the general population and potentially
anxiety-provoking experience of attending a cognitive assessment, the influence of
anxiety symptoms on components of working memory is poorly understood. Theorists
argue that anxiety can contribute to less effective and/or less efficient (slowed)
performance. Eysenck’s attentional control theory (2007) posits that reduced efficiency
may be related to the central executive component of working memory, through reduced
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inhibitory control and hypervigilant over-shifting of attention. Furthermore, cognitive
interference from worries may underlie this effect. The present study examined the
impact of state and general anxiety on working memory, including both efficiency and
accuracy of performance. Self-reported thoughts during tests were assessed to test the
theory of cognitive interference in anxious individuals. Lastly, effort during the
experiment was assessed with PVTs to control this as a third variable contributing to
diminished working memory performance, and to add to the literature on their
measurement in anxious and undergraduate populations.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Individuals in the high generalized anxiety group will perform
worse, and slower, than individuals in the low generalized anxiety group on working
memory measures tapping both the central executive and the phonological loop. In
contrast, the groups will perform equally on a task tapping the visual-spatial working
memory sketchpad.
Hypothesis 2. Any observed association between high generalized anxiety and
diminished performance on the central executive and phonological loop tasks will be
mediated by cognitive interference (distracting self-talk), consistent with cognitive
interference theory (Sarason, 1984).
Hypothesis 3. To disentangle the unique contributions of trait and state anxiety,
state anxiety will be manipulated in the high and low general anxious groups, to examine
differential effects on performance in working memory. It is hypothesized that after
receiving the situation stressor of anxiety-inducing instructions, state anxiety will exert a
main effect by reducing working memory on the central executive and phonological loop,
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but not the visual-spatial loop, as compared to performance prior to the stressor. An
interaction effect is also hypothesized, in that high general anxiety and high state anxiety
will potentiate the effect of anxiety on working memory, resulting in the high anxious
group exhibiting significantly greater deficits in working memory than the low anxious
group under the state anxiety induction. Following the stressor, cognitive interference is
hypothesized to mediate the inverse relationship between anxiety and performance for
both groups.
Hypothesis 4. General anxiety level will not impact effort testing in this anxious,
undergraduate sample, consistent with the majority of the literature on undergraduate
effort performance. Pass/fail rates of performance validity tests will not differ
significantly by group. Since PVTs commonly rely on working memory, attentional
control theory suggests that on untimed PVTs, scores will not differ by group affiliation;
however, on timed PVTs, high anxious individuals will perform more slowly.
Hypothesis 5. Undergraduate participants are hypothesized to put forth adequate
effort during testing. Therefore, performance validity failures will be infrequent in this
study, with less than 5% of students failing a measure.
Methods
Participants
Participants were undergraduates attending a large university in the northeast
United States, who were recruited from General Psychology courses. During the spring
semester, 1077 undergraduates completed prescreening testing. The students were 55%
female, and had racial diversity consistent with the overall university: 65.6% Caucasian,
19.7% Asian American, 9.9% Hispanic, 7.5% African American, 2.0% Middle Eastern,
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0.7% Native American, and 0.3% Pacific Islander. The vast majority of surveyed students
(985) successfully completed a brief anxiety screen to determine group affiliation for this
study. These undergraduates were statistically grouped by level of anxiety: high
(approximately top 25%), moderate (middle 50%), and low (bottom 25%).
Once grouped, 590 students qualified for the experimental arms of this study by
scoring in the highest and lowest quartile on the anxiety screen, thereby forming the high
and low anxiety groups, respectively (see Appendices C.1 and C.2). The high anxiety
group consisted of 310 (31.5%) students and the low anxiety group consisted of 280
(28.4%) students. Individuals in the moderate anxiety group (i.e., students in the middle
two quartiles) were ineligible for study enrollment.
The study continued enrollment until enough participants were enrolled in gendermatched groups to power the study analyses. In total, 90 participants were enrolled in the
study: 44 low anxiety (LA; 19 females and 23 males) and 46 high anxiety (HA; 25
females and 20 males) participants, see Table 1. Three participants were excluded due to
RA mistakes in administration (2) or failure to complete 50% of study measures (1),
resulting in a final total of 87 participants: 43 males and 44 females (50.6% female). No
participants self-identified as transgender. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 22 years,
with a mean age of 19.17 years (SD = .99). The majority of participants completed the
experiment during their freshman or sophomore years of college (85.1% of the sample).
Participants in the final sample identified as 52.9% European American/White, 39.9%
Asian/Asian American, 9.2% Hispanic American/Latino, 2.3% African American/Black,
1.1% North African, and 4.6% biracial. Approximately 1 in 4 participants (26.4%) was
born outside the United States. Although 34.5% of the sample learned English as a
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secondary language, the vast majority (90.8%) listed English as their primary language.
A majority of participants (92%) were right-handed and most (83%) have parents with at
least some college education.
Measures
Anxiety Screener. Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 Scale (GAD-7; Spitzer,
Kroenke, Williams, & Lowe, 2006). The GAD-7 was originally created for efficient
screening of anxiety in primary care and medical settings (Spitzer et al., 2006) and was
subsequently validated in community samples (Lowe et al., 2008). The self-report
questionnaire contains seven items targeting symptoms of general, or worry-based,
anxiety. Individuals are asked to report the frequency of each symptom over the past two
weeks by choosing “not at all,” “several days,” “more than half the days,” and “nearly
every day,” respectively scored 0, 1, 2, and 3. Total scores range from 0 to 21 with
anxiety severity cutoffs of >4 (mild), >9 (moderate), and >14 (severe). In varied
psychiatric samples, the measure effectively assessed anxiety severity but produced many
false positives, likely owing to overlapping symptoms experienced in many psychiatric
illnesses (Beard & Björgvinsson, 2014; Kertz, Bigda Peyton, & Bjorgvinsson, 2013). In a
community sample, a cutoff score of 10 has shown good sensitivity (89%) and specificity
(82%, Spitzer et al., 2006). In psychiatric samples, specificity is reduced by half (Kertz et
al., 2013). Therefore, while pragmatic in primary care or community samples, evaluative
follow-up is needed for diagnostic specificity. The measure demonstrates good
convergent validity with depression, anxiety, stress, and worry (Kertz et al., 2013).
Finally, confirmatory factor analysis suggested that the measure best supports a twofactor structure with somatic tension items (4, 5, and 6) and worry cognition items (Beard
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& Björgvinsson, 2014). In the present study, the GAD-7 was used to screen for anxiety.
A score of 7 or higher at the time of prescreening defined the upper anxiety quartile, and
scores of 0 or 1 defined the low anxiety quartile.
Intelligence Measure. Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler,
2001). This brief task is designed to assess general intellectual abilities by tapping an
individual’s vocabulary knowledge, considered an aspect of crystallized intelligence. In
this study, it was utilized to provide a measure of intellectual equivalency across both the
high anxiety and low anxiety groups. To complete the WTAR, participants read aloud
words that are pronounced irregularly. The number of mispronounced words from the list
of 50 provides a general approximation of intellectual functioning. The WTAR exhibits
excellent internal consistency (.90 to .97) in the US standardization sample. The test was
co-normed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (WAIS-III;
Wechsler, 1997a), and shows high correlations with WAIS-III Verbal IQ (r = .75), FSIQ
(r = .73), and verbal subtests. WTAR scores are better than demographic characteristics
at predicting IQ scores (Wechsler, 2001). It is considered an adequate measure of
estimating verbal IQ in individuals with expected IQs in the average range —like
undergraduates at a competitive public university. In addition to the WTAR, participants
were asked to self-report SAT scores to obtain another approximate measure of
intellectual ability for matching of groups.
Anxiety, Mood and Cognitive Interference Measures. Depression Anxiety
Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Symptoms of depression and
generalized (trait-like) anxiety were measured with the short-version of the DASS-42,
designed to measure the three factors of the tripartite model (L. A. Clark & Watson,
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1991): high arousal associated with anxiety (Anxiety subscale), low positive affect
(Depression subscale), and negative affect (Stress subscale). The scale consists of 21
items that are rated on a 4-point Likert scale from 0 to 3 with total scores ranging from 0
to 63 points. The DASS-21 has demonstrated good to excellent internal consistency for
all three scales (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Henry & Crawford,
2011). Overall, the scale appears to be comprised of four latent factors. Each scale
comprises separate factors, and together they share a fourth factor of general
psychological distress and negative affectivity (Henry & Crawford, 2011). The longer
form DASS-42 has acceptable to good test-retest reliability (.71-.81; Brown, Chorpita,
Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997). The DASS is becoming more frequently used in research
and clinical settings and is designed to improve upon measurement concerns with the
Beck scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Furthermore, it provides better discrimination
of anxiety and depression items than the trait-version of the STAI (Bieling, Antony, &
Swinson, 1998).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Form Y1, State (STAI; Spielberger, 1983). The
STAI is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure state and trait anxiety. It was
cited by Lezak and colleagues (2012b) as an optimal anxiety measure for use in
neuropsychological assessment, although the DASS has been shown to better assess trait
level symptoms. In this study, participants completed only the state form (Form Y1) for
assessment of current anxiety symptoms. The STAI consists of 20 items scored on a 4point Likert scale from 1 to 4 with total scores ranging from 20 to 80. A review of
published studies using the STAI found that the state questionnaire had a median reported
internal consistency of .92 across all studies (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). As expected,
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test-retest reliabilities were generally lower on this state-reliant measure, ranging from
.37 to .97 with a mean of .70.
Cognitive Interference Questionnaire (CIQ; Sarason & Stoops, 1978; Sarason,
Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986). The CIQ is a 22-item self-report questionnaire
constructed to assess an individual’s negative, off-task self-talk while completing a task
(see Appendix B). The measure also assesses how much the individual perceives that
these cognitions have distracted from their performance. The scale is broken into
subscales of “task-relevant worry” items (e.g., “I thought about how poorly I was doing”)
and “task-irrelevant thought” items (“I thought about other activities”). Each item is rated
on a 5-point Likert scale from “never” to “very often,” except for the last item; item 22
requires the participant to estimate their perception of how much their mind wandered
during the task on a 7-point Likert scale. The CIQ Task-Relevant Worry subscale is
composed of the total score of ten items (ranging from a possible 10 to 50), whereas the
CIQ Task-Irrelevant Thought subscale is composed of eleven items (range of 11 to 55).
The analyses were calculated using the total score across all 21 items on these subscales.
Total scores ranged from 21 to 105. The internal consistency is good for the 21-item scale
(Cronbach's alpha = .85; Lachman & Agrigoroaei, 2011).
Demographic Data. Participants self-reported age, gender and ethnicity, as well
as SAT Verbal and Quantitative scores.
Working Memory Tests. Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System Color-Word
Interference Test (CWIT; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). The D-KEFS CWIT is a task
designed to amend an inhibition/switching trial onto the original Stroop task’s color
naming, word reading, and inhibition trials, and is used in this study to assess the central
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executive. For each trial, the participant is presented with practice items and scored items.
On the stimulus page, there are horizontal rows of the trial-specific items (i.e., words,
colors). The participant is instructed to complete the task (e.g., read the words or name
the colors) from left to right until he/she has completed all of the rows. The item content
is presented in a random fashion, such that the colors do not follow a predictable pattern.
The trials are timed and the errors are counted. On the color naming trial, the participant
names the colors printed on the stimulus page as quickly as possible. The word reading
trial involves the participant reading the names of the same colors presented as words on
the page. For the inhibition trial, the participant is presented with the names of colors
printed in a different ink color (CWIT Condition 3: Inhibition). The participant is
instructed to say the name of the ink color, rather than reading the written color name.
Lastly, the inhibition/switching trial appears similar to the inhibition trial, except half of
the words are inside boxes (CWIT Condition 4: Inhibition/Switching). For the unboxed
words, the participant must say the ink color––like in the inhibition trial––however, for
the boxed words, the participant must instead read the written word. Normative data from
the D-KEFS manual was used to convert raw data to age-based scaled scores. For this
study, both Condition 3 and 4 will be used to assess central executive functioning.
Digit Span (Wechsler, 1997b). The digit span task is composed of both forward
auditory digit span and backward auditory digit span from the Wechsler Memory ScaleIII. In this study, the Digit Span task will be used to assess the phonological loop capacity
of the participant’s working memory. This task involves the evaluator reading strings of
numbers and then the participant repeating them back in the same order (Digit Span
Forward) or saying them back in reverse order (Digit Span Backward). Over the course
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of the task, the number strings increase in length. The participant’s score on the task is
calculated by adding together the number of successfully completed number strings for
each subtask to form one total score.
Spatial Span (Wechsler, 1997b). The spatial span task is composed of both
forward visual working memory span and backward visual working memory span from
the Wechsler Memory Scale-III. For the present study, Spatial Span will evaluate the
visual-spatial sketchpad component of the participant’s working memory. Like the Digit
Span task, the Spatial Span task involved both forward and backward subtests. A plastic
stimulus with raised, blue blocks is placed between the evaluator and the participant. For
each trial, the evaluator taps on the blocks one by one in a specific sequence. Then the
participant is instructed to either replicate this sequence exactly (Spatial Span Forward)
or reverse the order of the tapping in the sequence (Spatial Span Backwards). The final
score is the summation of all correctly completed items on both subtests. Raw scores
from both Digit Span and Spatial Span were converted to age-based normative scores
with the data available in the test manual.
Trail Making Test: Trail A and Trail B (Army Individual Test Battery, 1944).
Trails A and B together form a paper and pencil test of motor speed, attention, and
working memory. For this study, Trail B will tap the central executive component of
working memory. On Trail A, the participant is instructed to draw lines connecting
numbered circles in increasing numerical order. On Trail B, each circle encloses either a
number or a letter of the alphabet. The participant is instructed to drawing lines
alternating between increasing numerical order and sequential alphabetic order (e.g., 1 to
A to 2 to B, etc.). For both trails, the participant’s score is determined by their completion
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time. Trail A should provide an estimate processing speed, assuming intact motor
functioning. Normative data for this study was used from a study of undergraduate
students (Tombaugh, 2004).
Performance Validity Tests (PVTs). Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM;
Tombaugh, 1996). The TOMM is an untimed forced-choice, visual recognition memory
task where the participant is presented with each of the 50 items consecutively for 3
seconds each. Following this learning trial, the participant is then presented with 50 pairs
of pictures. Each pair includes one of the items was previously presented to them in the
learning trial and one is a novel (distractor) item. The participant must choose which item
he/she remembers from the learning trial. The evaluator provides immediate feedback
telling the participant if their choice is “correct” or “no, that’s not right. It was this one.”
In the original test, there are two learning trials, each followed immediately by a testing
trial. A 10-minute delayed retention testing trial may also be administered. For this study,
only the two learning trials with respective testing trials will be administered. Scores of
45 and above will be considered adequate performance on this measure (Tombaugh,
1996). Lower scores are uncommon among individuals putting forth good effort.
Rey-15 Item Test (Rey-15; Lezak, 1995). The Rey-15 item is a commonly used
untimed performance validity test that does not follow a typical forced-choice paradigm
and is easily and quickly given (Reznek, 2005). A card with 15 items, in five rows of
predictable patterns of three items, is presented to the participant for ten seconds.
Following the learning/recall trial, the participant is instructed to draw as many items as
possible on a blank piece of paper from memory. Free recall of fewer than nine items will
be considered a failure on the recall trial (Reznek, 2005). Then, the participant is
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immediately provided with a page of possible items from the learning trial (all 15) as well
as 15 distractor items. Participants are instructed to mark which items they remember
from the learning trial. The individual’s combined score is calculated [recall correct +
(recognition correct – false positives)], and a score of 21 and above is suggested for
individuals responding validly (Morse, Douglas-Newman, Mandel, & Swirsky-Sacchetti,
2013). In the present study, a score of 20 or below will be considered a failure for the
Rey-15 Item Combined score. Even individuals with significant brain injuries or other
degenerative disorders often score above the cutoff for this test.
Reliable Digit Span (RDS; Wechsler, 1987). The Digit Span task can be used as
an untimed embedded measure of performance validity. Since each length of digit string
is repeated twice for both subtests, a reliable digit span can be calculated by observing the
highest string length the participant completed for both trials at that length. Then the
highest reliable string length is summed for both subtests to determine the reliable digit
span. RDS is an effective measure for determining honest responders from simulators of
dishonest test performance (Jasinski, Berry, Shandera, & Clark, 2011). Based on the
normative data for the WAIS-III RDS, a cut score of 7.1 has been suggested (Jasinski et
al., 2011; Schroeder, Twumasi-Ankrah, Baade, & Marshall, 2012). For this study, a score
below 7 on the measure will be considered a failure of this validity test.
Dot Counting Test (DCT; Boone, Lu, & Herzberg, 2002). The DCT is a timed
test that is easily and quickly administered. The participant is shown 12 consecutive cards
with grouped and ungrouped dots. They are instructed to count the dots on each page and
announce the total number. Both the time it takes for the participant to complete the DCT
as well as the total counting errors are calculated for a total score––“E-score.” The
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manual suggests that a cutoff E-score of 14 is appropriate for non-clinical groups:
sensitivity of 88.2% and specificity of 96.1% (Boone et al., 2002). Scores equal to or
above 14 are considered evidence of poor effort in non-clinical groups.
Procedure
Prescreening. The study was approved by the university’s Institutional Review
Board. During the spring semester of 2015, General Psychology students completed a
prescreening survey to qualify for experimental studies through the psychology
department’s participant pool. Qualtrics, a secure internet-based survey software, was
used for the prescreening.
Participant Recruitment. Individuals that qualified for this study scored in the
upper and lower quartile of generalized anxiety based on prescreening data, and were
able to enroll in experimental appointments on the department’s experimental pool study
sign-up portal. Participants were not informed that prescreening data was used for
recruitment in this study. All participants were blind to the existence of experimental
groups as well as their group affiliation.
Experimental Appointments. Each participant attended a one-on-one, in-person
appointment lasting two hours with an undergraduate research assistant (RA) trained on
the study protocol. The appointments began with informed consent, including an
explanation of experimental procedures. Participants were asked to confirm abstinence
from caffeine for the prior three hours; none reported consuming caffeine. After the
consent process, the participant completed baseline questionnaires of anxiety, mood, and
demographics on a laptop computer using Qualtrics, except for two instances when the
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computer did not work, and paper-and-pencil administration was conducted. Then,
participants were administered the intelligence screener (WTAR) by the RA.
After overseeing these baseline tasks, the RA began the first of two phases of
neuropsychological and effort evaluations for the experiment. First, the RA read the
“supportive instructions” (see Appendix A). After which, the participant completed the
STAI again. The RA then administered a counter-balanced battery of working memory
and performance validity tests, followed by cognitive interference and state anxiety
questionnaires. Prior to each test, the RA read aloud a brief reminder of the supportive
instructions. For the second phase, state anxiety was induced and then the
neuropsychological and effort assessment tasks followed a similar format: the participant
heard the “anxiety-inducing instructions” (see Appendix A), filled out the STAI,
completed working memory and performance validity tests with abbreviated anxietyinducing instruction reminders, and then filled out the cognitive interference and state
anxiety questionnaires.
For both testing phases, RAs administered the CWIT, Digit Span (including
embedded RDS), Spatial Span, TMT, and DCT; therefore, each participant completed
these tests twice across the appointment to create a within-subject, repeated-measures
design. Each participant also completed the TOMM and the Rey-15 Item Test once
during either phase of experiment; order was counter-balanced across participants. The
supportive and anxiety-inducing instructions were adapted from Coy and colleagues (Coy
et al., 2011).
After completing all study procedures, participants were read and provided with a
written debriefing statement (see Appendix A). During the debriefing, the participant was
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informed that s/he would not receive the results of this testing, despite being told s/he
would at the start of the anxiety-inducing instructions earlier in the appointment.
Participants were provided with stamped copies of the debriefing statement, with contact
information for the study experimenters and the IRB. No participants inquired about
further information after leaving the appointment. Each participant received 4 credits
towards their General Psychology course for participation.

Administration Training
Seven undergraduate RAs were trained on administration of all study measures.
Each RA reviewed the manual-based instructions when provided for measures such as
Digit Span, Rey-15 Item and TOMM, and received verbal instruction from the student
investigator for those that did not have manuals, such as the DASS and STAI.
Additionally, the RAs were provided with in-vivo instructions as well as videotaped
directions. Following initial familiarity with each measure, the RAs practiced
administering the measures to the graduate student investigator, and to each other while
observed by the graduate student investigator.
After demonstrating sufficient administration abilities and gaining familiarity with
the experimental procedure as judged by the student investigator, each RA practiced the
entire protocol with an undergraduate enrolled through the department’s participant pool
but who did not qualify for either experimental group. These practice appointments were
videotaped and reviewed by the graduate student supervisor. In total, 15 practice
participants were recruited and filmed for establishing reliable administration procedures;
each of the seven RAs completed data collection with at least two practice participants.
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The practice participants were informed of their practice designation during the informed
consent process. RAs were considered trained when they successfully administered the
experiment to a practice participant, as judged by the student investigator.
Procedure Fidelity
Each RA collected data for four to 20 participants, based on scheduling. Each
week a review meeting was held with RAs, the student investigator and PI to review
procedures and answer ongoing administration questions. Halfway through data
collection, each RA completed a second videotaped “practice participant,” reviewed by
the student investigator, to ensure reliable administration and lack of drift from protocol
procedures. All RAs exhibited appropriate administration at this checkpoint. RAs were
blind to participant group membership.
Data Analytic Plan
All variables were tested for normality and descriptive statistics were calculated
(e.g., mean, total, standard deviations, ranges). T-test comparisons were completed
between groups for age, SAT score, and WTAR estimated intellectual score to establish
group equivalency. Gender distributions were also matched, using chi-square analyses.
To assess groups at baseline, t-tests were completed to assess differences for generalized
anxiety (on the GAD-7 and the DASS), state anxiety, stress, and depression.
To assess the first hypothesis, a one-way 2 (group) x 5 (cognitive task)
MANOVA was conducted to assess potential group differences on the various working
memory tasks during the first phase. In the event of significant results, post-hoc t-tests by
cognitive task were planned.
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Analyses to assess a mediation model in the second hypothesis were planned.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) to assess the potential mediation effect of cognitive
interference on the relationship between anxiety level and working memory tasks for the
high anxiety group during the first phase would be conducted.
The third hypothesis was analyzed with 2 (group) x 2 (phase) mixed-design
ANOVAs for each cognitive measure to assess the main and interactive effects of state
anxiety on performance across the HA and LA groups. If these analyses were found to be
significant, cognitive interference mediation analysis was planned via SEM.
The fourth hypothesis expanded upon the first by examining performance validity
by anxiety group, and then across phases. Percentages and frequency of failures of each
group’s PVT were reported. For measures failed more than once, chi-squared analyses of
pass/fail rates for each measure were conducted by group and phase. When fewer than
five cases were found in a chi-square analysis cell, Fisher’s exact test was used instead to
adjust for the small sample size. In addition to pass/fail rates, continuous scores on all
PVTs were assessed. For the TOMM and the Rey-15 Item (both only given once to each
participant), t-test analyses were conducted to assess group differences during the phase
in which the test was given. For RDS and the DCT, 2 x 2 ANOVA mixed design analyses
were conducted to examine effort performance by group and phase.
To address the fifth hypothesis, failures on performance validity tests were
determined (using the cutoffs presented in Table 6) and counted to assess effort in the
undergraduate sample collapsed across groups. The percentage of individuals with failed
PVTs were reported and compared to existing normative data.
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Power Section
Power analyses were conducted using G*Power 3.1 for the third hypothesis,
several ANOVA, repeated measures, within-between interactions. For each dependent
variable, 2 (group) x 2 (phase) mixed-design ANOVAs were planned. Based on Coy and
colleagues (2011) study of state anxiety manipulation with similar cognitive tasks, a
medium effect size was expected. Test-retest reliability for the cognitive measures ranged
from 0.65 to as high as 0.90. The a priori sample size calculations were conducted with
the most conservative estimates to ensure sufficient power for analyses. For 0.80 power,
0.05 alpha probability, 0.65 test-retest reliability, 0.02 small partial eta squared (estimated
total variance in the outcome variable accounted for by the predictor variable) for an
effect size of 0.14, a sample size of 70 was suggested (at least 35 per group).
Missing Data
During the recruitment phase, 90 participants were enrolled to ensure adequate
sample size in the event of missing data, administration errors, or PVT failures. Of the 90
enrolled, three participants were excluded from all analyses; two resulted from RA
administration errors, and one participant failed to complete 50% of questionnaire data.
Therefore, the final study sample numbered 87 participants, 42 in low anxiety and 45 in
high anxiety. Removal of three participants from the experimental sample did not
substantially alter the demographic data (see Table 1). Of the final sample of 87
participants, nine additional participants had missing data, which was determined to be
missing at random. Five of these participants skipped questions on the questionnaires.
Three were missing a score due to misadministration. Lastly, one participant reported
being color-blind; thus, scores on the Color-Word Interference Test were dropped from
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analyses. For the nine participants with minor amounts of missing data, pairwise deletion
was used. No participants discontinued the appointment or asked to be removed from
statistical analyses. Based on a final sample size of 87, the study was powered at 88%.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Baseline anxiety, mood and cognitive interference, reported in Table 1, were
within expected ranges for a community sample. Although strong floor or ceiling effects
were present on some measures, also due to use of a community sample, the sample size
was large enough for the central limit theorem to provide reasonable robustness of
proposed statistical analyses. Participants averaged a standard IQ estimate score of
106.05 (SD = 12.24), which is in the average range. Although 13.8% of participants
reported receiving speech language interventions, no estimated IQ scores fell below two
standard deviations of the mean (WTAR ranged from 71 to 127), indicating sufficient
English reading abilities for study inclusion. Only 6.9% of the sample reported currently
receiving psychological treatment or psychiatric medication. All participants denied
consuming caffeine in the three hours prior to the beginning of the experimental
appointment, as was required for study inclusion.
Descriptive Statistics by Group
Groups were evaluated for matching characteristics of gender, age, estimated IQ,
and SAT score. As shown in Table 2, no group differences were found for gender (X2(1,
87) = 0.93, p = 0.336), age (t(85) = .38, p = .706), or estimated IQ (t(85) = .26, p = .793).
No group differences were noted for Math or Verbal SAT scores (t(78) = -1.40, p = .165
and t(76) = -.29, p = .769, respectively). Descriptive statistics by group for each of the
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symptoms questionnaires, performance validity measures, and cognitive tests are
provided in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10. All variables were evaluated for normality.
Baseline Symptom Group Comparisons
As expected, based on selective recruitment procedures, pre-screened general
anxiety differed by group; the HA group reported more anxiety, t(56.38) = -11.67, p <
.001. Reassessment of general anxiety at baseline indicated that this group difference was
maintained over the recruitment period, with the HA group again reporting more
symptoms on the GAD-7 anxiety scale, t(85) = -3.47, p = .001. Additionally, the HA
group reported more state anxiety at the beginning of the experimental appointment (t(85)
= -2.56, p = .012; see Table 2).
Manipulation Check
During both phases of the experiment, the participants reported state anxiety prior
to and just after receiving phase instructions, which were intended to be either supportive
or anxiety-inducing. A 2 (group) x 2 (state anxiety) mixed-design ANOVA was
completed for pre- and post-instruction state anxiety for both instruction types. For the
supportive instructions, there was a small main effect of group, indicating that the HA
group endorsed more state anxiety overall (F(1, 84) = 5.08, p = .027, r = .24). There was
no main effect of state anxiety across time (F(1, 84) = .15, p = .696, r = .04), and no
interaction effect (F(1, 84) = 1.97, p = .164, r = .15). For the anxiety-inducing
instructions, which were always given second, there was a medium main effect, whereby
state anxiety was higher after the instructions as compared to state anxiety after phase 1
but right before the second instructions (F(1, 83) = 22.79, p < .001, r = .46). There was
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not a significant main effect of group, F(1, 83) = 2.84, p = .096, r = .18, nor an
interaction effect, F(1, 83) = .23, p = .630, r = .05.
Hypothesis 1: General Anxiety Variability on Working Memory Performance
To assess potential group differences on the various working memory tasks
during the first phase, a 2 (group) x 5 (cognitive task) MANOVA was conducted. Using
Pillai’s lambda, there was not a significant effect of group on working memory
performance during the supportive phase, V = 0.07, F(5, 80) = 1.19, p = .321.
Hypothesis 2: Cognitive Interference as Mediator Between Anxiety and Working
Memory
Since there was no relationship between anxiety and working memory during the
first phase, cognitive interference mediation analyses were not conducted.
Hypothesis 3: State Anxiety and Working Memory Performance
The impact of state anxiety on working memory performance was assessed with 2
(group) x 2 (phase) mixed-design ANOVAs, with each working memory measure serving
as the dependent variable. For speeded central executive functioning on the TMT Trail B,
a medium main effect of phase was found: individuals in the anxiety-inducing phase
completed the task more quickly, F(1, 85) = 48.31, p < .001, r = .60. Neither the main
effect of group, F(1, 85) = 2.28, p = .135, r = .16, nor the interaction of group and phase
were significant, F(1, 85) = .87, p = .353, r = .10. On speeded central executive
functioning, CWIT Condition 3: Inhibition, there was a large main effect of phase with
participants completing the task quicker on the anxiety-inducing phase, F(1, 84) = 85.19,
p < .001, r = .71. There was no main effect of group affiliation (F(1, 84) = .25, p = .621, r
= .05) or interaction effect (F(1, 84) = 3.44, p = .067, r = .20). On CWIT Condition 4:
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Inhibition/Switching, the main effect of phase was again significant with a large effect
size (F(1, 84) = 89.10, p < .001, r = .70). There was no group main effect (F(1, 84) = .01,
p = .941, r = .01) or interaction effect (F(1, 84) = .09, p = .766, r = .03). Therefore, group
did influence the central executive; however, performance was significantly improved
during the second phase of induced state anxiety for all measures of the central executive.
For the two untimed cognitive tasks, Digit Span assessed phonological loop
capacity and Spatial Span assessed visual-spatial sketchpad capacity. For both, 2 (group)
x 2 (phase) mixed-design ANOVAs were completed. On Digit Span, assessing
phonological loop capacity, there was a medium main effect of phase, indicating that
participants performed better on the second, anxiety-inducing phase, F(1, 85) = 20.104, p
< .001, r = .44. There was no main effect of group (F(1, 85) = .02, p = .886, r = .02) and
no interaction effect between group and phase (F(1, 85) = .09, p = .764, r = .03).
Similarly, on Spatial Span, the measure of visual-spatial sketchpad capacity, there was a
medium main effect of phase, with higher performance in the second phase (F(1, 85) =
15.35, p < .001, r = .39). There was neither a main effect of group, F(1, 85) = 1.08, p =
.301, r = .11, nor an interaction effect of group and phase, F(1, 85) = .00, p = .986, r =
.00. In sum, for both timed and untimed measures of working memory (regardless of
component), analyses revealed consistently significant phase effects with faster/better
performance occurring during the second phase. Group affiliation was not associated with
working memory performance across phases.
It was hypothesized that for both groups during the second phase, cognitive
interference would mediate the relationship between anxiety and neurocognitive
performance for the phonological loop task (i.e., Digit Span) and the central executive
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task (i.e., CWIT Condition 3 and 4, TMT Trail B). Although group affiliation determined
by level of general anxiety was not associated with working memory performance, state
anxiety may have been associated with working memory performance. Therefore,
regression analyses investigated this proposed relationship for both groups during the
second phase. For the HA group, state anxiety did not predict performance for any of the
central executive/phonological loop measures (Digit Span, R2 = .01, F = .53, p = .472;
CWIT Condition 3, R2 = .00, F = .00, p = .951; CWIT Condition 4, R2 = .00, F = .05, p =
.830; TMT Trail B, R2 = .04, F = 1.84, p = .182). Moreover, state anxiety did not predict
central executive/phonological loop performance in the LA group (Digit Span, R2 = .07,
F = 2.84, p = .100; CWIT Condition 3, R2 = .04, F = 1.47, p = .233; CWIT Condition 4,
R2 = .02, F = .71, p = .403; TMT Trail B, R2 = .06, F = 2.35, p = .133). Since the
relationship between anxiety and working memory was not found in any of these
analyses, the proposed mediator of cognitive interference could not be assessed.
Hypothesis 4: Anxiety Level and Performance Validity
The fourth hypothesis examined whether generalized anxiety or state anxiety
impacted effort testing. No participants from either group failed the TOMM Trial 2 or the
Rey-15 Item Recall; therefore, analyses of pass/fail rate by group on these tests were not
applicable. The most frequently failed PVT was the DCT at 10 failures, with eight
failures from the LA group (see Table 7). Notably, individuals in the LA group did not
fail any other PVT in this study. For the DCT, individuals from the LA group were more
likely to fail this test (see Table 8). RDS was failed five times, all by participants in the
HA group. When comparing failures on the RDS and DCT during the supportive
instructions phase, Fisher’s exact test revealed that failed test type differed by group
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status (p = .024). If a participant failed RDS, he/she was more likely to be in the HA
group, whereas the reverse was true for the DCT.
Finally, to examine failure across PVTs, failure rates were combined across the
RDS and DCT. For both the RDS and DCT, there were a total of eight failures (16.67%)
in the LA group and seven (13.33%) failures in the HA group. To investigate the
possibility that group status might predict failure on either of these two commonly failed
PVTs, individuals were sorted into those with RDS/DCT failures and those without
failures on either test. Group status was not predictive of a tendency to fail a performance
validity test, using the Fisher’s exact test (p = .342; Table 9).
In addition to dichotomizing PVTs into “failures” and “non-failures,” continuous
scores can be calculated for all PVTs, and were analyzed for possible group effects. For
example, although an individual may not “fail” a PVT outright, overall scores may be
lower for a particular group. The TOMM and the Rey-15 were only given once during the
experiment, so t-tests were conducted to determine possible group differences during the
phase in which the measure was administered to the participant. On the Rey-15 Item, the
Recall trial was used to eliminate the outlying Recognition score (described above).
There were no group differences for either phase on the TOMM Trial 2 (t(50) = -1.28, p
= .206 for supportive phase and t(33) = .76, p = .450 for anxiety-inducing phase).
Likewise, there were no group differences on the Rey-15 Item Recall trial scores during
the supportive instructions phase (t(33) = .76, p = .450) or the anxiety-inducing
instructions phase (t(49) = -.18, p = .858).
The RDS and the DCT were administered twice to each participant; therefore, 2
(group) x 2 (phase) mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted for each measure. Although
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not hypothesized to predict performance, there was a medium main effect of phase on
RDS scores, which are accuracy and not time-based. All participants performed better on
RDS during the second, anxiety-inducing phase, F(1, 85) = 16.33, p < .001, r = .40.
There was neither a significant group effect nor interaction effect between group and
phase, F(1, 85) = .66, p = .418, r = .09 and F(1, 85) = .02, p = .890, r = .02, respectively.
Performance on the DCT was assessed by integrating accuracy and speed of
performance to calculate the E-score. There was a large main effect of phase whereby
performance improved during the second phase regardless of group affiliation, F(1, 84) =
82.01, p < .001, r = .70. Although it was hypothesized that the HA group would perform
this test more slowly, there was no main effect of group on timed performance (F(1, 84)
= 1.81, p = .182, r = .15). A medium interaction effect indicated that although both
groups performed the task more quickly during the second phase, the LA group improved
to a greater extent from the first phase to the second phase (F(1, 84) = 4.89, p = .030, r =
.23; see Figure 1). Pictorial representation of this effect suggests that the LA group had
more room for improvement, since they were mathematically but not statistically slower
during the first phase than the HA group. Analyses of only timed (without accuracy)
components of the E-score on the DCT revealed similar results (all p > .05).
Hypothesis 5: Performance Validity in an Undergraduate Sample
Pass/fail cutoff scores for each PVT were reported in Table 6. Following these
guidelines, 2.87% of all administered PVTs were failed (15 of 522). However, 13 of 87
participants (14.94%) failed at least one measure (see Table 7). Two participants, one
from each group, failed the same measure twice, once during each phase. These
participants failed different measures from each other (i.e., the DCT and RDS). Table 11
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depicts PVT results for any participant with at least one PVT failure. The majority of the
PVT failures (73.33%) occurred during the supportive-instructions, or first, phase (11 of
15). No participants (0%) failed the TOMM. One HA participant failed the Rey-15 Item
during the anxiety-inducing instructions phase, with an unusually low score far below the
cutoff (-2 out of 21). Despite intact free recall of many items, this participant missed all
true positives and made many false positives on the recognition trial, using recall trial
only cutoffs, this participant did not fail the measure (Reznek, 2005). In sum, no
participants were found to fail the TOMM or the Rey-15 Item, both of which were given
just once during each appointment.
Discussion
The current study evaluated the relationship between anxiety and working
memory in undergraduates pre-screened for general anxiety level. In addition, the study
investigated performance validity failures in the undergraduate sample, including
students with low and high general anxiety. Although groups were found to be
significantly different in their anxiety level at baseline, few group differences were found
when assessing the main hypothesis regarding a relationship between working memory
and anxiety. Analysis of performance validity resulted in some group differences and
new information regarding invalidity in an undergraduate and sub-clinically anxious
sample.
Working Memory and Anxiety
During the supportive instructional phase, the HA and LA groups did not differ on
any of the cognitive tasks administered to assessing working memory functions: the
CWIT Inhibition or Inhibition/Switching Trials, Digit Span, Spatial Span, or Trail
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Making Test: Trail B. For the HA group during the supportive phase, state anxiety did
not predict performance on any of the working memory measures, despite the higher
endorsement of general anxiety. On both timed and untimed measures of working
memory, group affiliation (based on general anxiety) was not associated with
performance. These results do not support Eysenck’s attentional control theory, which
states that anxiety likely interferes with efficiency of working memory but not
effectiveness—particularly related to the central executive component of Baddeley’s
working memory model. Regardless of the working memory component targeted by the
tasks in this study (i.e., central executive, phonological loop, or visuo-spatial sketchpad),
anxiety level was not predictive of performance.
Notably, both groups performed working memory tasks more efficiently and/or
more accurately (depending on the measurement type) during the second administration.
These findings may be the result of practice effects and/or elevated effort towards testing
(following anxiety-inducing instructions during the second phase). However, state
anxiety during the second phase was not predictive of working memory performance in
either group. Therefore, if anxiety is presumed to co-vary with motivation (which was not
assessed nor conclusively agreed upon by researchers), there is tentative evidence that a
practice effect may be the culprit rather than an arousal induction.
In sum, the theorized effect between general anxiety and working memory
performance was not supported by the data. As a result, proposed mediation analyses of
cognitive interference were neither suggested nor possible. Both Eysenck’s theory of
attentional control and Sarason’s theory of cognitive interference have primarily
investigated trait or test anxious community individuals, with less focus on symptoms of
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generalized anxiety—the type assessed in this study. Alternative anxiety focus (i.e.,
cognitive worry, arousal, physiological assessment) or symptom measure may have
resulted in more support for these theories. More likely, however, the analyses completed
in this study were hindered by the low endorsement of anxiety symptoms and resultantly
constrained group differences within the community sample. Further exploration of study
limitations and future directions is considered below.
Performance Validity
Based on concerns about frequent performance invalidity in undergraduate
samples (An et al., 2012), this study assessed performance validity of all participants,
using several stand-alone PVTs (i.e., the TOMM, Rey-15 Item, and DCT), and one
embedded PVT (i.e., Reliable Digit Span). No participants from either the HA or LA
groups fell below cutoffs on the TOMM Trial 2 or the Rey-15 Item Recall Trial. This
study adds to the growing literature that undergraduates exhibit adequate effort to pass
the TOMM, the most-widely used, stand-alone performance validity measure according
to neuropsychologists with expertise in validity testing (Schroeder, Martin, & Odland,
2016). In addition to this study, both prior studies using the TOMM with undergraduates
failed to find any failures on the measure (An et al., 2012; Silk-Eglit et al., 2014). The
Rey-15 Item, tied for fourth most frequently administered PVT in clinical practice
(Schroeder et al., 2016), has not been previously examined in an undergraduate validity
study. Only one participant failed the Rey-15 Item Recognition Trial by perfectly
reversing target-distractor discrimination; therefore, it is likely that this second language
English learner may have misunderstood the recognition instructions, perhaps mistakenly
circling new items rather than recognized items. This participant passed the Recall trial,
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and all other participants in this study passed both trials on the test; therefore, the present
study provides preliminary evidence of a useful and robust measure of effort in
undergraduate populations. Furthermore, the Rey-15 Item test is quickly administered
and is available in the research literature so it can be used without additional cost to the
researcher.
Despite the promising results from this study about the utility of the TOMM and
the Rey-15 Item in undergraduate samples, nearly 15% of the sample had at least one
failure on two other PVTs, the DCT and RDS. Both the LA and HA groups had at least a
13% failure rate. This result is lower than An and colleagues (2012) findings, but is
consistent with more recent results found using a battery of embedded computerized
indices on the CNS Vital Signs (DeRight & Jorgensen, 2015). Almost three-fourths of the
failures occurred during the first administration in the repeated measures design, during
the “supportive-instructions” phase. It is possible that a practice effect decreased the
effectiveness of using the measures during the second phase. Alternatively, the “anxietyinducing instructions” phase resulted in a perceived increase in task demands, which may
have increased the participants’ motivation to put forth good effort. In
neuropsychological research, it is common for participants with two failures to be
designated as failing to meet effort requirements. This study had two participants with
two failures, one from each group (see Table 11).
Although group affiliation was not predictive of the likelihood of failing any
PVT, it was predictive of which PVT was failed. During the supportive phase, when most
PVT failures occurred and instructions most closely reflected typical neuropsychology
examinations, individuals in the HA group were more likely to fail RDS and individuals
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in the LA group were more likely to fail the DCT. Overall, the majority of PVT failures
in the HA group were on the embedded RDS measure, which is designed to measure
working memory ability rather than assess performance validity. Therefore, RDS may be
more susceptible to working memory weaknesses seen in individuals with affective
states, despite the lack of significant results related to transient anxiety in this study.
Many clinicians use embedded measures of performance validity, particularly when
pressed for time, when no external incentive is readily identifiable, and/or when monetary
funds are not available for stand-alone PVTs. Only two participants in the HA group
failed a stand-alone PVT (Table 11). These results suggest that embedded PVTs,
specifically RDS, may not be reliable for determining performance validity in individuals
with at least subclinical general anxiety. Individuals with clinical levels of general
anxiety are at least as likely to fail RDS as those found in this study.
These findings contribute to a small literature on performance validity testing in
individuals with anxiety. Two prior studies in older adults found no failures on the
TOMM in self-reported high state and trait anxious individuals. The present study adds to
this literature by showing that individuals with sub-clinical general anxiety also did not
fail the TOMM. Additionally, this study provides additional information about how subclinically anxious individuals perform on the Rey-15 Item, DCT, and RDS. In sum, as
stated above, the RDS appears to be more sensitive to anxious distress than the other
three PVTs administered in this study.
In contrast to looking at PVT failures, continuous scores on PVTs were also
inspected. Group affiliation alone did not differentially predict continuous scores on the
TOMM, Rey-15 Item Recall Trial, RDS, or DCT. On the DCT and RDS, individuals
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performed better during the second administration, regardless of group affiliation. For the
DCT, the LA group also showed greater improvement over time, although both groups
improved. This finding suggests that the “anxiety-provoking,” phase 2 instructions may
have been successful at increasing the perceived importance of the task, which in turn
increased effort towards task completion. On the other hand, participants may have
simply scored better due to a practice effect, as previously noted.
Limitations
Several limitations were identified in this study. The sample was constrained.
Study participants were all undergraduates recruited from a community sample, which
limits the generalizability of findings to typical neuropsychology referrals. The majority
of the patients, even those in the HA group, did not present with clinical levels of anxiety.
Overall, the lack for support for hypothesized outcomes in this study are attributed to the
community sample used. Not only were the groups both subclinical in anxiety level, there
was little variance across the available students in the pool. Students were also prescreened for anxiety symptoms over a month before baseline testing was readministered
and many students showed variability of self-reported symptoms over that time. Some
students in the HA group, for example, reported less anxiety at baseline but were still
considered part of the HA group, which overall was still significantly higher in selfreported anxiety than the LA group. Those who did have significant anxiety may have
been attending psychotherapeutic and medication interventions, which may have lowered
the influence of anxiety on working memory. The HA group reported significantly more
anxiety symptoms on the general anxiety questionnaire; however, this difference in
anxiety may not have reached clinically meaningful levels. Therefore, the study may not
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have been able to approximate differences found between non-anxious and highly
anxious individuals. The theorized conditions used to develop this study may only be
valid in individuals with significant anxiety rather than subclinical levels. Additionally,
general anxiety was the target of the screening and baseline questionnaires (rather than
trait anxiety). Studying different types of clinical levels of anxiety may provide richer
information about how these proposed mechanisms (e.g., cognitive interference, poor
inhibitory control) might occur for anxious individuals.
The sample also consisted of undergraduates at a public university with selective
admissions; thusly, the recruitment pool and final sample were more highly educated than
the general public, which may limit the generalizability of this study’s findings. Many
individuals in this sample learned English as a second language or did not use English as
their primary language at present. Therefore, there may have been some difficulty with
reading comprehension or understanding the RA’s instructions, which may have
interfered with potential effects, particularly in a subclinical sample where expected
effect sizes are small.
Unfortunately, since the phases were not counterbalanced, practice effects likely
account for nearly all improvement seen across time, a rather unlikely finding otherwise
that anxiety-inducing instructions related in improved performance for individuals with
higher general anxiety. The students in that group, however, would not generally have
qualified for clinical levels of generalized anxiety; therefore, their responses may not be
the same as expected for individuals with clinical anxiety. Their ability to use motivation
to overcome anxious interference may have been greater.
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The instructions used in this study are not typical of neuropsychological
evaluations. This change, like with any situational factor, can alter the results observed.
Many neuropsychologists who use PVTs in their practice will encourage patients to
always give their “best effort” and may even let them know that poor effort will be
noticeable during testing. These instructions have been developed to encourage
individuals with plans to falsely represent themselves and/or individuals with low
motivation to provide good, consistent effort for interpretable results. Given that this was
a low stakes testing environment, it is possible that by not noting this possibility for the
participants, some individuals with low motivation may have invalidated their
performance. If accurate, this effect may have undermined the primary hypothesis
involved detecting differences in performance between high and low anxious groups;
individuals with low anxiety may not have been compelled to put forth high effort and
may have appeared more consistent with performance in the HA group.
Many situational or contextual factors can play a role in performance. For
example, the majority of RAs were aware, at least to some extent, about the study’s aims
and hypotheses. One of the RAs who helped write the IRB was also needed to run
participants due to time constraints. Additionally, the focus of the research laboratory on
anxiety-related research makes it difficult to blind RAs from the role of anxiety in
research questions. All RAs were blinded to group affiliation of the participant, and many
RAs were unaware of the existence of different group affiliations, as participants and
RAs were blinded to the process of appointment assignments.
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Conclusions and Future Directions
In summary, the current study presents new findings related to performance
validity in both undergraduate and elevated general anxiety samples. Consistent with
prior research, undergraduates and individuals with elevated anxiety symptoms passed
the TOMM without issue. Adding to this literature base, the Rey-15 Item was also not
failed by anyone from either group, suggesting that this measure may be less sensitive to
affective distress. In contrast, the DCT and RDS were failed fairly frequently, resulting in
an overall PVT failure rate of approximately 15%. They were also predictive of HA and
LA group affiliation. RDS was frequently failed by individuals with sub-clinical levels of
anxiety; the DCT was more likely to be failed by individuals with few anxiety symptoms.
Future extensions from these findings suggest that additional studies should look at a
variety of PVTs with undergraduate students, and consider which PVTs are most
informative when working with these participants. Additionally, more research into the
types of PVT failures observed in clinically anxious populations is needed, particularly
since many PVTs are associated with working memory and attentional factors—possible
weaknesses in this population. The confound of internal motivation, commonly seen in
anxious high-achievers, is an additional variable that future studies might consider.
Since support for a link between anxiety and working memory functioning has
grown, there may be opportunities to clinically intervene to help individuals with anxiety
who complain of cognitive problems or who are documented to have reduced working
memory abilities (Crocker et al., 2013; Snyder, Miyake, & Hankin, 2015). Over the past
several decades, cognitive rehabilitation interventions have gained empirical and clinical
support for use with individuals with mild cognitive deficits (Cicerone et al., 2011).
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These interventions are presently indicated for individuals with mild cognitive
impairment, amnestic type (Hampstead, Gillis, & Stringer, 2014) and executive
functioning deficits (Cicerone, Levin, Malec, Stuss, & Whyte, 2006). Cognitive
psychotherapy is empirically supported for anxious individuals with distorted self- or
world-beliefs; therefore, cognitive rehabilitation techniques targeted at working memory
and executive functioning skills may be a natural adjunct to traditional cognitivebehavioral therapy. Providers likely find that their anxious patients frequently complain
of difficulties concentrating and completing tasks efficiently, which suggests that the
patient would be open to activities geared at rehabbing these difficulties. In fact, a recent
pilot study found that a 3-week-long working memory training resulted in improved
attentional control, trait anxiety, and resting state EEG (Sari, Koster, Pourtois, &
Derakshan, 2015). Research into the effectiveness and feasibility of cognitive
rehabilitation for individuals with anxiety is recommended.
Lastly, only a handful of studies have directly investigated the interplay between
working memory, anxiety, and biomarkers; however, recent research is promising and
may even provide fruitful ways to differentiate between effort and motivation in working
memory task engagement of individuals with anxiety (Berggren & Derakshan, 2012;
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2010). Future studies are encouraged to use translational research
techniques for pursuit of a neurological link with theorized models.
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Appendix A
Examiner-Administered Instructions
Adapted from (Coy et al., 2011)
SUPPORTIVE INSTRUCTIONS
Taken from (Coy et al., 2011)
“As was mentioned earlier, this project involves you performing tests that assess
attention, concentration and memory. Before we begin, though, we want to let you know
that these tests are commonly used to assess abilities in many individuals for
psychological experiments. Some tasks will be fairly easy for you to complete whereas
some will likely be more difficult. In general, just try to complete the tests to the best of
your abilities. At the end of testing, we will be happy to discuss any questions you may
have or explain the testing further with you. Any questions?”
ANXIETY-INDUCING INSTRUCTIONS
Adapted from (Coy et al., 2011)
“As was mentioned earlier, this project involves you performing tests that assess
attention, concentration and memory. The first round of tests was for practice. Now we
will complete the actual testing. You should know, these tests have been shown to be
highly related to intelligence and ability to do college work. They are also related to
success in later life such as earned income and occupational attainment. As you likely
noticed, many of these tests may seem quite difficult. During each test, you will be timed
and notes will be taken regarding your performance. It is important that you do well this
time around because at the end of the session, we will review the results with you and
compare your performance with the performance of other college students. We will also
be able to tell if you have not improved upon your practice scores. Any questions?”
Examiner-Administered Instruction Reminders
Adapted from (Coy et al., 2011)
SUPPORTIVE REMINDER
“Remember, we are not that concerned about your performance, so do not worry so much
about whether you are doing good or bad. Please just do your best. We want to remind
you that no one will see the results of your performance.”
ANXIETY-INDUCING REMINDER
“Remember, this round is the actual testing. These tests have been shown to be highly
related to intelligence and ability to do college work. It is important that you do well this
time around because at the end of the session, we will review the results with you and
compare your performance with the performance of other college students.”
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Debriefing Statement*
Written for this study
“Thank you for completing the study today. Although the tasks completed in this study
do inform our understanding of cognitive abilities in undergraduate students and young
adults, we will not be informing you about your performance today. We were interesting
in learning how different factors, including situational factors impact performance.
Today, we investigated how instructions and self-disclosed emotional experiences impact
cognitive performance on these tasks. Our findings suggest that it’s possible for our
emotional experiences to hinder our performances on these sort of measures. We really
appreciate the time and energy you put into completing this experiment and will be
looking at performances at the groups level. Your results will be analyzed along with
other individuals’ performances who completed the same measures to understand the
main study objective. If you have any questions about the study procedures, please
contact the graduate student research or faculty members listed on your Debriefing
Statement.”
*Participants were read aloud this statement and provided with a written copy, which
included study contact information.
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Appendix B
Cognitive Interference Questionnaire
(Sarason et al., 1986; Sarason & Stoops, 1978)
Instructions: This questionnaire concerns the kinds of thoughts that go through people’s
heads at particular times, for example, while they are working on a task. The following is
a list of thoughts, some of which you might have had while doing the task on which you
have just worked. Please indicate approximately how often each thought occurred to you
while working on it by placing the appropriate number in the blank provided to the left o
each question.
1= Never

2= Once

_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______

3= A few times

4= Often

5= Very often

1. I thought about how poorly I was doing
2. I thought about what the experimenter would think of me.
3. I thought about how I should work more carefully.
4. I thought about how much time I had left.
5. I thought about how others have done on this task
6. I thought about the difficulty of the problems.
7. I thought about my level of ability.
8. I thought about the purpose of the experiment.
9. I thought about how I would feel if I were told how I performed.
10. I thought about how often I got confused.
11. I thought about other activities (for example, assignments, work).
12. I thought about members of my family.
13. I thought about friends.
14. I thought about something that made me feel guilty.
15. I thought about personal worries.
16. I thought about something that made me feel tense.
17. I thought about something that made me feel angry.
18. I thought about something that happened earlier today.
19. I thought about something that happened in the recent past
(last few days, but not today).
20. I thought about something that happened in the distant past.
21. I thought about something that might happen in the future.

_______
_______

22. Please circle the number on the following scale which best represents the degree to
which you felt your mind wandered during the task you have just completed.
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

6

7
Very Much
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Tables
Table 1.
Demographic Information of the Overall Sample
Variable Name

Overall Sample (n = 90)

Missing
Data

Gender

44 males; 46 females

0

Age (years)

19.18 (1.01),
18 - 22

1

WTAR (SS)

106.12 (12.31),
71 - 127

1

SAT Math

637.60 (88.02),
400 - 800

7

SAT Verbal

595.84 (83.89),
300 - 780

9

Demographic Information of the Experimental Sample
Variable Name

Experimental Sample (n = 87)

Missing
Data

Gender

43 males; 44 females

0

Age (years)

19.17 (0.99),
18 - 22

0

WTAR (SS)

106.05 (12.24),
71 - 127

0

SAT Math

637.14 (87.66),
400 - 800

7

SAT Verbal

597.22 (85.16),
300 - 780

9

Note. Data are presented as Mean (SD), Minimum - Maximum values.
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Table 2.
Demographic Information, Prescreening, and Baseline Symptoms by Group
High Anxiety
Group
(n = 45)
20:25

Low Anxiety
Group
(n = 42)
23:19

19.13 (1.06)
18 - 22

WTAR

Variable Name
Gender (M:F)

X =0.925

p-value
.336

19.21 (0.93)
18 - 22

0.379

.706

105.71 (12.56)
71 - 127

106.40 (12.03)
73 - 127

0.263

.793

Math SAT

650.46 (86.86)
400 - 800

623.13 (87.41)
400 - 800

-1.403

.165

Verbal SAT

600.00 (89.50)
300 - 780

594.29 (81.44)
450 - 730

-.294

.769

Prescreen GAD-7

9.38 (4.68)
0 - 21

.67 (1.72)
0-8

-11.666***

< .001

Baseline GAD-7

7.64 (5.54)
0 - 21

4.02 (4.00)
0 - 14

-3.474**

.001

Baseline DASS-21
Overall Score

12.60 (11.68)
0 - 50

5.44 (5.93)
0 - 24

-3.633**

.001

Baseline DASS-21
Depression Scale

3.38 (3.45)
0 - 14

1.59 (1.99)
0-7

-2.986**

.004

Baseline DASS-21
Anxiety Scale

3.69 (4.57)
0 - 20

1.56 (2.15)
0 - 11

-2.804**

.007

Baseline DASS-21
Stress Scale

5.53 (4.78)
0 - 19

2.29 (2.49)
0-9

-3.994***

< .001

40.49 (12.81)
20 - 75

34.10 (10.21)
20 - 54

-2.562*

.012

Age (years)

Baseline STAI

t-value
2

Note. Data are presented as Mean (SD), Minimum - Maximum values.
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 3.
Questionnaire Results from Experimental Phases
Variable Name
STAI
Post-Supportive Instructions

High Anxiety
39.43 (13.395)
20 - 75

Low Anxiety
34.79 (10.626)
20 - 55

t-value
-1.786

p-value
.078

STAI
Post-Round 1 Testing

38.89 (11.831)
20 - 80

34.59 (11.565)
20 - 57

-1.703

.092

CIQ Total
Post-Round 1 Testing

45.18 (13.920)
21 - 102

45.02 (14.129)
22 - 97

-.093

.929

CIQ Relevant
Post-Round 1 Testing

26.71 (7.879)
10 - 47

26.56 (7.513)
11 - 48

-.007

.995

CIQ Irrelevant
Post-Round 1 Testing

18.48 (8.577)
11 - 55

18.47 (8.675)
11 - 49

-.053

.958

STAI
Post-Anxiety Ind. Instructions

42.98 (13.172)
20 - 80

38.51 (13.864)
20 - 77

-1.540

.127

STAI
Post-Round 2 Testing

40.55 (13.651)
20 - 80

35.83 (13.296)
20 - 77

-1.621

.109

CIQ Total
Post-Round 2 Testing

42.40 (14.175)
21 - 102

42.60 (15.682)
22 - 97

0.64

.949

CIQ Relevant
Post-Round 2 Testing

25.76 (8.705)
10 - 50

25.14 (10.127)
10 - 50

-.306

.760

CIQ Irrelevant
Post-Round 2 Testing

16.64 (8.394)
11 - 55

17.47 (8.511)
11 - 47

.455

.650

Note. Data are presented as Mean (SD), Minimum - Maximum values.
Note. +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 4.
Cognitive Measures by Group, for TMT and CWIT
Variable Name

High Anxiety

Low Anxiety

t-value

p-value

TMT Trail B T-Score
Round 1 Testing

53.46 (11.63)
34.3 - 91.8

58.05 (16.95)
34.3 - 110.7

1.48

.142

TMT Trail B T-Score
Round 2 Testing

44.74 (8.78)
31.1 - 72.9

46.63 (9.49)
28.0 - 70.5

.97

.337

CWIT 3: Inhibition Scaled Score
Round 1 Testing

11.91 (1.83)
7 - 16

12.34 (2.07)
7 - 16

1.02

.309

CWIT 3: Inhibition Scaled Score
Round 2 Testing

13.38 (1.64)
10 - 16

13.32 (1.77)
9 - 16

-.17

.869

CWIT 4: Inhibition/Switching Scaled Score
Round 1 Testing

12.02 (1.42)
9 - 15

12.00 (2.80)
2 - 15

-.05

.964

CWIT 4: Inhibition/Switching Scaled Score
Round 2 Testing

13.53 (1.44)
10 - 16

13.61 (1.46)
10 - 16

.24

.808

Note. TMT = Trail Making Test. CWIT = Color-Word Interference Test.
Note. Data are presented as Mean (SD), Minimum - Maximum values.
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 5.
Cognitive Measures by Group, for DS and SS
Variable Name

High Anxiety

Low Anxiety

t-value

p-value

DS Total Scaled Score
Round 1 Testing

10.51 (2.87)
5 - 17

10.64 (2.42)
6 - 18

.23

.818

DS Total Scaled Score
Round 2 Testing

11.36 (2.90)
5 - 18

11.38 (2.46)
7 - 18

.04

.965

DS Forward Span z-score
Round 1 Testing

.01 (.88)
(-1.99) - 1.75

.12 (.90)
(-1.42) - 1.75

.54

.590

DS Forward Span z-score
Round 2 Testing

.12 (.90)
(-1.24) - 1.75

.12 (.85)
(-1.42) - 1.75

-.02

.987

DS Backward Span z-score
Round 1 Testing

.32 (.94)
(-1.40) - 2.03

.17 (.90)
(-1.40) - 2.03

-.73

.470

DS Backward Span z-score
Round 2 Testing

.56 (.98)
(-1.40) - 2.03

.41 (.93)
(-1.40) - 2.03

-.71

.482

SS Total Scaled Score
Round 1 Testing

12.58 (2.09)
8 - 17

12.10 (2.65)
5 - 17

-.95

.347

SS Total Scaled Score
Round 2 Testing

13.47 (2.49)
8 - 18

12.98 (2.42)
8 - 18

-.93

.355

SS Forward Span Scaled Score
Round 1 Testing

12.27 (2.54)
5 - 16

11.43 (3.57)
5 - 18

-1.27

.208

SS Forward Span Scaled Score
Round 2 Testing

13.07 (3.02)
5 - 18

12.69 (2.38)
7 - 18

-.64

.523

SS Backward Span Scaled Score
Round 1 Testing

12.31 (2.41)
7 - 17

12.21 (2.67)
5 - 17

-.18

.859

SS Backward Span Scaled Score
Round 2 Testing

13.29 (2.57)
7 - 17

12.81 (2.56)
7 - 17

-.87

.386

Note. DS = Digit Span. SS = Spatial Span.
Note. Data are presented as Mean (SD), Minimum - Maximum values.
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 6.
PVT Cutoffs Implemented
PVT

Cutoff

TOMM

<45 on Trial 2 (Tombaugh, 1996)

DCT

≥14 E score (Boone et al., 2002)

Rey-15 Recall

<9 for the learning/recall trial (Reznek, 2005)

Rey-15 Combined

<21 for the combined recall and recognition score (Morse, et al., 2013)

RDS

<7 score (Schroeder, et al., 2012)

Note. TOMM = Test of Memory Malingering; DCT = Dot Counting Test; Rey-15 Recall = Rey15 Item Test Recall Trial; Rey-15 Combined = Rey-15 Item Test Recall and Recognition
Combined Score; RDS = Reliable Digit Span.
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Table 7.
PVT Failures
Test Name

Total

HA Group

LA Group

SI Phase

AI Phase

TOMM

0

0

0

0

0

DCT

10

2

8*

8

2

Rey-15 Recall

0

0

0

0

0

Rey-15 Combined

1^

1^

0

0

1^

RDS

5

5*

0

3

2

Across all tests

15

7

8

11

4

Note. TOMM = Test of Memory Malingering; DCT = Dot Counting Test;
Rey-15 Recall = Rey-15 Item Test Recall Trial; Rey-15 Combined = Rey-15 Item Test
Recall and Recognition Combined Score; RDS = Reliable Digit Span.
Note. *One participant failed this measure twice
Note. ^Failure likely related to ESL comprehension issue. The Rey-15 Recall scores
were assessed instead.
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Table 8.
Group affiliation by DCT or RDS failure during supportive-instructions phase
High Anxiety

Low Anxiety

Total

DCT failure

1

7

8

RDS failure

3

0

3

Total

4

7

11

Note. DCT = Dot Counting Test; RDS = Reliable Digit Span.
Note. Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.024.
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Table 9.
Group affiliation by DCT/RDS failure or pass during supportive-instructions phase
High Anxiety

Low Anxiety

Total

DCT/RDS failure

4

7

11

Neither failed

41

35

76

Total

45

42

87

Note. DCT = Dot Counting Test; RDS = Reliable Digit Span.
Note. Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .342.
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Table 10.
PVT Scores by Group
Variable Name

High Anxiety

Low Anxiety

t-value

p-value

TOMM Trial 2
Round 1 Testing

50.00 (.00)
50 - 50

49.79 (.77)
46 - 50

-1.44

.161

TOMM Trial 2
Round 2 Testing

49.95 (.21)
49 - 50

50.00 (.00)
50 - 50

.764

.450

DCT E-score
Round 1 Testing

9.62 (1.78)
6 - 14

10.57 (2.97)
5 - 22

1.79

.078

DCT E-score
Round 2 Testing

8.33 (1.75)
5 - 14

8.49 (1.90)
4 - 15

.39

.695

Rey-15 Recall
Round 1 Testing

14.86 (.64)
12 - 15

15.00 (.00)
15 - 15

.76

.450

Rey-15 Recall
Round 2 Testing

14.86 (.64)
12 - 15

14.83 (.76)
11 - 15

-.18

.855

Rey-15 Combined
Round 1 Testing

29.55 (.86)
27 - 30

30.00 (.00)
30 - 30

2.49

.021*

Rey-15 Combined^
Round 2 Testing

29.67 (.80)
27 - 30

29.10 (1.68)
22 - 30

-1.43

.506

RDS
Round 1 Testing

9.60 (2.11)
6 - 15

9.88 (1.64)
8 - 15

.69

.493

RDS
Round 2 Testing

10.22 (2.01)
6 - 14

10.55 (1.71)
8 - 15

.81

.420

Note. TOMM = Test of Memory Malingering; DCT = Dot Counting Test;
Rey-15 Recall = Rey-15 Item Test Recall Trial; Rey-15 Combined = Rey-15
Item Test Recall and Recognition Combined Score; RDS = Reliable Digit Span.
Note. Data are presented as Mean (SD), Minimum - Maximum values.
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Note. ^Excluding outlier described in text
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Table 11.
PVT Failures by Participant*
Phase 1
Rey-15
DCT
Recall

ID

Group

TOMM
Trial 2

20

LA

-

Pass

28

LA

Pass

53

LA

60

Phase 2
Rey-15
DCT
Recall

RDS

TOMM
Trial 2

Fail

Pass

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

-

Fail

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

-

Fail

Pass

-

Pass

Fail

Pass

LA

Pass

-

Fail

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

Pass

62

LA

-

Pass

Fail

Pass

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

79

LA

Pass

-

Fail

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

Pass

88

LA

Pass

-

Fail

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

Pass

3

HA

-

Pass

Pass

Fail

Pass

-

Pass

Fail

4

HA

-

Pass

Pass

Fail

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

5

HA

-

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

-

Pass

Fail

18

HA

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

-

Pass

Fail

Pass

19

HA

-

Pass

Fail

Pass

Pass

-

Pass

Pass

51

HA

Pass

-

Pass

Fail

-

Pass

Pass

Pass

RDS

Note. TOMM = Test of Memory Malingering; DCT = Dot Counting Test; Rey-15 Recall =
Rey-15 Item Test Recall Trial; Rey-15 Combined = Rey-15 Item Test Recall and Recognition
Combined Score; RDS = Reliable Digit Span.
*Only participants with at least one failure were included.
Note. - means that the test was not given during that phase.
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Figure 1.
Dot Counting Test (DCT) Interaction Effect by Group and Phase
11.5
HA
Group

11

LA Group

DCT E-Score

10.5
10
9.5
9
8.5
8
7.5
Supportive Intructions
(Phase 1)

Anxiety-Inducing Instructions
(Phase 2)
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